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Caterina Bori

**One or Two Versions of Al-
Siyāsa al-Shar‘iyya of Ibn
Taymiyya?
And what do they tell us?**

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Author's address

Caterina Bori (PhD Rome, MA SOAS, BA Bologna)
Associate Professor in the History of Islam and Muslim Societies.
Department of History and Culture.
Alma Mater Studiorum
Università di Bologna
Via Zamboni, 33
40126 Bologna (IT)
tel. 0039 (0)51 2098471
caterina.bori@unibo.it

One or Two Versions of al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya of Ibn Taymiyya?
And what do they tell us?

By Caterina Bori
caterina.bori@unibo.it

Caterina Bori (PhD, University of Rome La Sapienza) is currently Associate Professor in the History of Islam and Early Modern Muslim Civilizations at the University of Bologna (Italy). Before that she was teaching fellow in the History Department at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London) and Research Fellow at the Zentrum Moderner Orient (Berlin). She has published extensively on Ibn Taymiyya and his historical milieu, and is currently exploring the transmission of the doctrines of *siyasa shar‘iyya* into the Mamluk and early Ottoman periods.

Her recent publications include:

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- "Religious Knowledge between Scholarly Conservatism and Commoners' Agency", in: Armando Salvatore, Babak Rahimi, Roberto Tottoli (ed.s), *The Wiley-Blackwell History of Islam and Islamic Civilization* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd), 2017 (forthcoming).
- "Il pensiero politico sunnita nel medioevo islamico. La questione del califfato: al-Mawardi (m. 1058) e Ibn Taymiyya (m. 1328)", in: *Storia del pensiero politico islamico*, Massimo Campanini (ed.), Milano: Mondadori, 2016, pp. 47-67.
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One or two versions of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* of Ibn Taymiyya? And what do they tell us?

Abstract

Ibn Taymiyya’s *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya fī iṣlāḥ al-ra‘ī wa-l-ra‘iyya* is a very famous book. *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* is also a complex work that displays a variety of meanings cohabiting rather harmoniously. The generic and synthetic nature of this treatise, together with Ibn Taymiyya’s controversial legacy, has opened the way to many different claims of what the treatise is about. To some extent, the purpose of the present paper is simple. I intend to present and discuss the contents of Ibn Taymiyya’s *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* through a close reading of the text that will take into account two different editions of it so far unnoticed by Western scholars. By so doing, I hope that some of the prevailing ideas about what *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya fī iṣlāḥ al-ra‘ī wa-l-ra‘iyya* is can be complemented by new perspectives. In particular, I shall argue that the common view that the book is about the coercive power of the state as in punishment, jihad and public order is to be partially revisited and that pursuing a study of the text’s manuscript tradition is an urgent scholarly task. By focusing on the existence of different versions of Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise on *siyāsa*, the present paper also raises questions about their possible meanings.

1. Introduction¹

The present paper is part of a bigger project. It is a companion to another study where I consider the dating and recipient of *al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya*, its genesis and literary genre, previous literature about the text, the meaning of the concept of *siyāsa* and its relationship to those of *sharʿ* and *sharīʿa* in Ibn Taymiyya’s writings. To some extent, the purpose of the paper is simple. I intend to present and discuss the contents of Ibn Taymiyya’s famous treatise *al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya fī iṣlāḥ al-rāʿī wa-l-raʿiyya* through a close reading of the text that takes into account a version of it recently discovered and edited. By so doing, I hope that some of the prevailing ideas about what *al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya fī iṣlāḥ al-rāʿī wa-l-raʿiyya* is about can be complemented by new perspectives. The new edition of the text was published in 2008, that is, more than eight years ago. It presents whole passages missing from the shorter and most widespread version of it. That for a while now two different versions of Ibn Taymiyya’s famous treatise have been in circulation is a fact that has gone unnoticed by those scholars who have recently published either specifically on this text or on Ibn Taymiyya’s political project as a whole.

2. The text as we have it

Thanks to the translation into French by Henri Laoust, which was published in 1948, *al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya fī iṣlāḥ al-rāʿī wa-l-raʿiyya*² enjoyed a wide circulation in Western scholarly circles.³ Brief summaries of it can be found in any standard textbook on medieval Islamic political thought, often relying both on Laoust’s classic study on Ibn Taymiyya’s social and political doctrines and on his translation of and introduction to *al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya*.⁴ Henri Laoust’s translation contributed to the diffusion in the West of a work whose title has produced the currently popular “tag” of *siyāsa sharʿiyya*, commonly, and narrowly, understood as “politics according to the divine law.” Working in the first half of the 20th century, Henri Laoust based his translation on two early printed editions of the text, 1888 Bombay and 1905 Cairo, and collated it to two manuscripts, Damascus Zāhiriyya, *Adab al-manthūr* 76 (dated AH 734) and Paris Bibliothèque Nationale 2443 (date not mentioned). He promised to publish his own edition of the text, but unfortunately he never did.⁵ Since then various printings of the treatise have been put into circulation; they are pretty much the same

¹ The present version of the paper was completed on 10 December 2016, but was updated and revised on 22 March 2017. I would like to thank all the fellows of the Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg (May–July 2016) for their feedback and help with this piece of research.

² Depending on how one reads the particle *fī*, the title can be translated as *Governance according to the religious normativity regarding the righteousness of the shepherd and his flock*, or *Governance according to the religious normativity for the righteousness of the shepherd and his flock*. This second translation is the one most commonly adopted by Western scholars. Ibn Rushayyiq al-Maghribī (d. 749/1348), the Mālikī follower of Ibn Taymiyya who authored a list of his works, reports the title of the work with a *li-* in place of *fī*: *al-Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya li-iṣlāḥ al-rāʿī wa-l-raʿiyya*. Cf. Ibn Rushayyiq, *Asmāʾ muʿallafāt shaykh al-islām Ibn Taymiyya*, in: *al-Jāmiʿ li-sīrat shaykh al-islām Ibn Taymiyya khilāl sabʿat qurūn*, eds. Muḥammad ʿUzayr Shams and ʿAlī al-ʿImrān, Mecca: Dār ʿālam al-fawāʿid, Dār ʿālam al-fawāʿid li-l-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ, 1422AH [2001] (2nd print), 306.

³ Laoust, *Traité*.

⁴ A good example is Black, *History*, 158–163 on Ibn Taymiyya which mainly relies on Laoust, *Essai*. Johansen’s influential article on Ibn Taymiyya’s *Siyāsa al-sharʿiyya* relies on Laoust’s translation of the treatise: Johansen, *Perfect Law*, 259–294.

⁵ Laoust, *Traité*, xlvi.

and generally without references to the manuscripts they are based on.⁶ One notable exception is the recent edition by ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-‘Imrān published in Mecca by Dār ‘ālam al-fawā’id in 2008.⁷ This edition displays a detailed introduction which includes a list of extant printed versions of the text, an attempt at dating the text, a full description of the manuscripts used with samples of incipits and colophons.⁸ Most importantly, this edition is based on a manuscript preserved at the Sülaymaniyya Library in Istanbul, MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā, where *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* is bound in a codex gathering a *Qā’ida fī al-ḥisba* (*Precept on the institution of ḥisba*), copied on 16 Rabī‘ I 780 (12 July 1378) and a *Qā’ida fī la‘b al-shaṭranj* (*Precept on the game of chess*) copied on 19 Rabī‘ I 780 (15 July 1378). The text of *al-Siyāsa* was copied on Friday 8 Rabī‘ I 780 (4 July 1378). These three works were written by the same unknown hand closely in time, one after the other.

Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, its colophon states that it was copied from an autograph (*naqaltu min nuskha julluhā bi-khaṭṭ al-muṣanniḥ*).⁹ Besides, the Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā has portions of the text that are missing from its many printed versions in circulation. Muḥammad al-‘Imrān claims that at some point this version of the text must have been abridged by some unknown hand, and not by Ibn Taymiyya.¹⁰ The claim that the shorter version of the text is an abridged version of the longer one is supported by the fact that this manuscript (i.e., Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā) introduces the contents as:

This is a treatise that comprises the concise and substantial principles of divinely oriented governance (*hādhihi risāla tataḍammanu jawāmi‘ min al-siyāsa al-ilāhiyya*).¹¹

While others, even earlier manuscripts, present the text as an abridgement:

This is an abridged treatise which comprises the concise and substantial principles of divinely oriented governance (*hādhihi risāla mukhtaṣara fīhā jawāmi‘ min al-siyāsa al-ilāhiyya*).¹²

The latter wording is also the one we find in the various printings of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* in circulation today.¹³ Yet, other than this, we have no concrete evidence that supports the argument that the abridgement was not carried out by Ibn Taymiyya. It may have been Ibn Taymiyya himself working and reworking the text, editing it, although this was not in his style.¹⁴ Currently, the evidence shows that there were at least two different texts of the same work, one longer and one shorter. From what I have seen, in terms of manuscript activity, the

⁶ Among the available prints, I was able to check: Ibn Taymiyya, *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, ed. Lajnat ihyā’ al-turāth al-‘arabī; *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, in: *Majmū‘ fatāwā*, 28: 244–397; *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, ed. ‘Iṣām Fāris al-Ḥarastānī. For a list of extant printed editions, see al-‘Imrān, *Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq*, 34–35.

⁷ *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, ed. al-‘Imrān.

⁸ Al-‘Imrān, *Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq*, 5–67.

⁹ Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā, fol. 76r. I would like to thank Ahmet Kayli for sending me the manuscript materials which I use and quote in this paper. As for Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā, these correspond to the first seven folios and the last three ones (ff. 1v–8r and 74r–76r) of *al-Siyāsa*, to the first three folios and the last two ones of the *Qā’ida fī al-ḥisba* (ff. 77r–79r and 88v–89v), and to the first two and last two folios of the *Qā’ida fī la‘b al-shaṭranj* (90r–92r and 114v–116r). The last text also displays a numeration by page.

¹⁰ Al-‘Imrān, *Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq*, 32–33.

¹¹ Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā, fol. 1v.

¹² Sülaymaniyya MS 2889 Ayasofia, fol. 1v. The text was copied in Rajab 744/November 1343 (fol. 47v). The name of the copyist is unknown. A later copy, Sülaymaniyya MS 2886 Ayasofia, displays the same incipit, fol. 2r. The text was copied in Ramaḍān 893/August 1488 (fol. 47v).

¹³ Cf. *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 9. Al-‘Imrān mentions neither Sülaymaniyya MS 2889 nor Ayasofia MS 2886.

¹⁴ On Ibn Taymiyya’s writing style, see Caterina Bori, Collection and Edition, especially p. 5. and Vasalou, *Ibn Taymiyya’s Ethics*, 16–17.

short text predates the long one. For instance, Sülaymaniyya MS 2889 Ayasofia (titled *Kitāb al-siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*) was copied in Rajab AH 744, and as far as I was able to check, apart from some minor variants, its text of *al-Siyāsa* is the same as that of the short, more widespread one.¹⁵ Of course this does not mean that in terms of composition the longer text necessarily postdated the shorter (in this case the latter could not be its abridgment), but only that as things stand the manuscript tradition of the text offers us a copy of the longer version which is later than the other one. For some reason, the shorter version enjoyed a wider circulation. Further research on the manuscript tradition of Ibn Taymiyya’s *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* may shed more light on this specific problem.

In what follows, I have used the 1993 edition by Fāris al-Ḥarastānī and compared it to the one by Muḥammad al-‘Imrān (2008). When of help to the understanding of the treatise, I present and discuss the portions of the text missing from its most widespread version, which especially occur in the second part of the book. Generally speaking, *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* is a complex work displaying a variety of meanings that cohabit rather harmoniously. The generic and synthetic nature of the text, together with the controversial legacy of Ibn Taymiyya, has opened the way to many different claims of what the treatise is about. Recent literature on *siyāsa shar‘iyya* will be discussed somewhere else. The present paper aims at surveying and reviewing the contents of the book by taking into account the new edition, and at highlighting the significance of this new version of the text for a fuller understanding of what this famous treatise is about. Where I can, and mainly in footnotes, I draw attention to other writings of Ibn Taymiyya which touch on the various topics discussed in *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* albeit always in a highly synthetic way. When relevant, I also rapidly point to parallels to and differences from two other major works of governance literature, al-Māwardī’s (d. 1058) *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya* and Ibn Jamā‘a’s (d. 1333) *Tahrīr al-aḥkām fī tadbīr ahl al-islām*. Al-Māwardī’s *Aḥkām* represents the “canon” of the genre, while Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamā‘a was an influential Shāfi‘ī Chief Qadi and a contemporary to Ibn Taymiyya.¹⁶ The underlying point is that *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* was not born out of nothing, although more is to be done in this direction. The contents’ review proposed here hopes to rectify the common view, or at least to complement it, that the book is mainly about the coercive power of the state as in punishment, jihad and public order. This is not to say that these themes are not there, but that there is more to it.

3. Nature and structure of the text.

The first folio of the Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā is densely scribbled. What the folio shows are statements bearing the birth dates, and in one case the death date, of the children of the various owners of the codex (all notes date to the beginning of the 11th Hijrī century, that is the end of the 16th, beginning of the 17th Gregorian century). There are also two seals. One appears as the bequest (*waqf*) seal of the vizier Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā, while the other is not clearly readable on the (partial) digital copy at my disposal.¹⁷ Among all, centrally located and in bigger script, stands the title: *Jawāmi‘ min al-siyāsa al-shar‘iyya fī salāḥ* (and not *islāḥ*) *al-rā‘ī wa-l-ra‘iyya*.¹⁸ The title clearly resumes two lines from the beginning of text

¹⁵ I was able to see only the beginning and end of a digital copy of Sülaymaniyya MS 2889 Ayasofia, ff. 1r–5r and 43v–48v.

¹⁶ Ibn Taymiyya’s and Ibn Jamā‘a’s “political” thought have been compared in previous scholarship, but mainly from the point of view of the caliphate. Cf. Rosenthal, *Political Thought*, chap. 2 and Lambton, *State and Government*, 138–151.

¹⁷ The date of the bequest seal of Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā is not readable. Thanks to Noah Gardiner and Nasser Rabbat for giving me some of their time with this material.

¹⁸ In spite of this, Muḥammad al-‘Imrān, who—as pointed out—bases his edition on Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā, chooses the most widespread title: *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya fī islāḥ al-rā‘ī wa-l-ra‘iyya*.

(folio 1v., ll. 6–7 from below) and it is penned by the same hand that copied the three writings assembled in the codex.

It is intriguing to note that, in this very same first folio, the titles of the other two short works were added below the main one (i.e. *Jawāmi‘ min ...*) by another hand in what looks like a hurried writing. This suggests that, in terms of subject matter, the person who originally copied and possibly assembled the three texts together perceived them as all belonging to “the *siyāsa shar‘iyya* family.” That is, initially all three works might have been subsumed under the same title of *Jawāmi‘ min al-siyāsa al-shar‘iyya fī salāh al-rā‘ī wa-l-ra‘iyya*, a title pointing to the major of the three writings, but conceptually including the others as well.¹⁹ Keeping close to Ibn Taymiyya’s own wording enables us to locate important clues about the nature of the text. The fact that it is intended to illustrate the *jawāmi‘*, namely “the concise and substantial principles” (of divinely oriented governance), is a crucial indication of the synthetic nature of this writing. Throughout the text Ibn Taymiyya repeats this point: he wants to stay general and keep it short: “The purpose [here] is to mention concisely the substantial rulings” (*wa-innamā al-gharaḍ dhikr al-jumal al-jāmi‘a*), he states when discussing various types of public income.²⁰ His aim, then, is to provide substantial but short guidelines for “just *siyāsa*” (*al-siyāsa al-‘ādila*), not details.²¹

Oh, you who believe! Obey Allah, the Messenger and those charged with authority among you. If you differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger (Q. 4:59).²²

While in the classics of Islamic political literature this verse, which exhorts the believers to obey God, his Messenger and men in authority, was commonly used as the scriptural lynchpin to support the obligatory nature of obedience to the authorities in charge, the contents of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* are rather organized around the previous verse of *Sūrat al-nisā‘*, that is Q. 4:58.²³ The first part of this verse exhorts to render trusts to their owners (*inna allāha ya‘murukum an tu‘addū al-amānāt ilā ahlihā*), while the second commands to rule or judge with fairness (*wa-idhā ḥakamtum bayna al-nās an taḥkumū bi-l-‘adl*). According to Ibn Taymiyya, the recipients of such recommendation are “men in authority.”²⁴ Ibn Taymiyya plainly states that Qur’ān 4:58 refers to rulers, while the following verse, Qur’ān 4:59, concerns the subjects and demands obedience from them. In other words, as long as the shepherd performs his duties, obedience is due to him from his flock. First and foremost, these duties consist of rendering deposits back and ruling/judging with fairness: “If public

¹⁹ This is certainly true for the *Qā‘ida fī al-ḥisba*, as it will be shown in the course of this paper. More is to be done in regard to the text on chess.

²⁰ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 53.

²¹ The expression *al-siyāsa al-‘ādila* occurs at the very beginning. *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 12. From now on, when no major differences with the edition of al-Muḥammad al-‘Imrān occur, I will refer to the printed edition of *al-Siyāsa* edited by ‘Iṣām Fāris al-Ḥarastānī.

²² The translation is that of Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur’ān*, Madina, AH 1413 with some adjustments.

²³ See al-Māwardī, *Aḥkām*, 13. Ibn Jamā‘a, *Taḥrīr al-aḥkām*, 52.

²⁴ *Qāla al-‘ulamā‘: nuzilat al-ayat al-ulā [i.e. 4:58] fī wulāt al-umūr*. From *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 11 but also *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 5. If we were to look at two colossal authoritative Sunni *tafsīr* widespread in Ibn Taymiyya’s time as al-Ṭabarī’s and al-Rāzī’s, we would notice that al-Ṭabarī, in particular at the end of his commentary of Q. 4:58, and after having also provided another interpretation, is very explicit in stating: “O you men in charge of the affairs of Muslims (*wulāt umūr al-muslimīn*), God orders you to render back what your flock entrusted you with.” The emphasis is on material restitution. The recommendation al-Ṭabarī addresses to those in authority is essentially not to mismanage their subjects’ money and properties. On the contrary, such a straightforward connection between the duties of those in authority and their subjects’ rights is not in al-Rāzī’s commentary. Cf. al-Ṭabarī (d. 922), *Jāmi‘ al-bayān ‘an ta’wīl āy al-qur’ān*, 30 vols., Cairo: al-Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1954–1968, 4:144–146, the quotation is from p. 146 and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210), *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr*, 32 vols., ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad, Cairo: al-Ṭab‘ al-bahiyya al-miṣriyya, 1934–1967, 10:137–140.

authority (*wilāya*) is obliged to render deposits back to their owners and to rule with fairness, then these two obligations are the essence of just *siyāsa* and sound authority” (*jimā‘ al-siyāsa al-‘ādila wa-l-wilāya al-ṣāliha*), writes Ibn Taymiyya with impressive lucidity.²⁵ Thus, the book illustrates these two obligations.

Consistently, the content organization of the treatise follows this iron logic. Its first section (*al-qism al-awwal*) develops around the Qur’ānic injunction to give deposits back to their owners by focusing respectively on the qualities of public offices (four chapters, or *fuṣūl*) and on “public wealth” (five chapters). In the course of this paper, it will become clear, I hope, that both public offices and public wealth are conceived as two different types of trusts (*amānāt*). The second part of the book (*al-qism al-thānī*) is built around the importance of judging or ruling with equity, or fairness (i.e. around the second part of verse 58 of sura 4). Here, the rights of God and those of men are separately dealt with, each in eight chapters, as according to a standard organization of *fiqh* books. There is no doubt, hence, that *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* was thought primarily for men in authority because, put in coarse terms, if they behave, ordinary people behave too. This seems to be the message of the opening page, and it is around this message that the book’s contents are organized too. In this regard, the neat and tidy content arrangement of the text is striking given Ibn Taymiyya’s propensity both for digression and outspoken polemics. This is not to say that *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* is devoid of critique, quite the contrary. It is just that the critique to the system is here molded within the framework of the rather polished language and advisory tone typical of governance and advisory literatures.

4. Contents

In what follows, I identify four content-related clusters which aim at charting rather closely the major topics of the treatise.

I. Ethical leadership

The book’s first concern is with the ethics of governance, that is the ethical principles that should inspire the conduct and decisions of men of authority. I will call this thematic preoccupation “ethical leadership,” by which I mean the inclination in governance to go beyond personal interests in order to embrace and promote the public good.²⁶ There is not much jurisprudence in this first part of the text.²⁷ The vocabulary to describe public offices is generic: *wālī al-amr*, *wulāt*, *wilāyāt*, *rā‘ī*, *dhū al-sulṭān*, *sulṭān*, rarely *muwwāb*, once *khalīfa*.²⁸ Eventually lists of different offices occur, as a way to include them all.²⁹ No office is dealt with specifically. What matters are those necessary qualities that will allow the aims of each single office to be achieved. These are *in primis* fairness (*‘adl*), then trustworthiness (*amāna*) and strength (*quwwa*), all subsumed under the capability of always giving priority to the common interest, or public good (*maṣlaḥa*). It is precisely the primacy of the common welfare that emerges conspicuously in this first section of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, and then again and again all through the text. In Ibn Taymiyya’s view, it is clear that this principle should orient human “political” actions as well individual and communal agency.³⁰ Public

²⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 12.

²⁶ I take the expression “ethical leadership” from John Knights, “Ethical Leadership: How to Develop Ethical Leaders”, Routledge White Papers 2016: <https://www.routledge.com/posts/9951> (last access: 5 October 2016).

²⁷ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 13–40.

²⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 25.

²⁹ For instance, Ibn Taymiyya, *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 16, 25, 69.

³⁰ See Sophia Vasalou on the primacy of welfare, or utility, in Ibn Taymiyya, as the foremost criterion for assessing the ethical value of human acts. Vasalou, *Ibn Taymiyya’s Ethics*, 45–54, 100–102.

authority (*wilāya*) is understood as an act of trust, or a deposit (*amāna*), which is not to be betrayed. Namely, the trust that was deposited in somebody's appointment to a specific office is to be rendered back by pursuing the aim of that specific office and by being aware of the means to achieve such aim (*wa-idhā 'urifat al-maqāšid wa-l-wasā'il tammāt al-amr*).³¹ Beyond the single specific objectives of each public function, the exercise of the different types of public authority, such as military command, judgeship or leadership in prayer, falls within a broad vision which envisages the improvement and protection of the material and spiritual conditions of people as the necessary step to ensure the triumph of God's word in this world.³²

Betrayal of trust can be avoided by distributing public offices exclusively to the best available (*aṣlah al-mawjūd*) for the charge in question. *Maṣlaḥa*, or acting with a view to the implementation of the public good, is upheld by precedents provided by Prophetic practice, the dictates of necessity (*ḍarūra*) and commonsensible considerations. Thus, all mingled together, these sources and criteria become the informing principles of the various choices to be taken by men of authority.³³ Embracing a highly utilitarian approach, the idea of "the best qualified" (for a given office with its given task) is the leitmotif running through this first thematic cluster. It allows enough flexibility for Ibn Taymiyya to move back and forth between the high ethical standards he sets for those in authority and the pragmatism of real life, both of which are well exemplified by the two main qualities every man of authority should be equipped with: trustworthiness (again, *amāna*) and force (*quwwa*).³⁴ Responding to the same pragmatic outlook, neither *amāna* nor *quwwa* consists of unchangeable prerogatives but both depend on the context.³⁵ They vary accordingly to the office in question (*wa-l-quwwa fī kull wilāya bi-ḥasbihā*) and the goal of that specific office. Hence, strength and force in military command consists in courage, experience, shrewdness and the command of various military techniques, while strength and power in judging (*ḥukm*) consists in knowing what is fair and being capable of applying rulings.³⁶ Eschatological threatening is generously scattered throughout these first pages of the treatise with the purpose of highlighting the sensitivity of the topic in question:

The Prophet said: "When trust is lost, wait for the Hour!" It was said: "O Messenger of God! What causes its loss?" He answered: "When command is given to the person who does not deserve it, then wait for the Hour!"³⁷

II. Public wealth (*al-amwāl al-sulṭāniyya*)

The second form of trust "to be restituted" is public wealth. Hence, the second thematic cluster of the book revolves around the sources of income, the fair distribution and management of public revenues.³⁸ A fair distribution of public wealth is an ongoing concern for Ibn Taymiyya. He deals with it also in a short treatise titled *Qā'ida fī al-amwāl al-sulṭāniyya*, where one finds a similar classification of what constitutes "public money" and how it should be spent. Yet, in this text Ibn Taymiyya provides a historical excursus of how

³¹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 15–21, 35, 37, 39. The transliterated passage is from page 35, l. 2.

³² *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 37–39.

³³ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 15, 28, 29, 31, 32–33.

³⁴ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 24–25, 27–29.

³⁵ Again Vasalou, *Ibn Taymiyya's Ethics*, 135 highlighting the context-dependence of human acts as typical of Ibn Taymiyya: "Where the value depends on the consequences (the utility) of actions, the same action can be good in some circumstances and bad in others."

³⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 24–25.

³⁷ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 19–20. An examination of the eschatological materials used in this treatise is beyond the purpose of this paper. Nothing of this sort has ever been conducted on *al-Siyāsa shar'iyya*.

³⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 41–78.

different rulers, from the Abbasids to the Ayyubids, adopted different financial policies or created new stipendiary posts (*al-wazā'if al-rātiba*). He highlights the extent to which these policies conformed or not to the practice of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs and when their innovations were acceptable or not.³⁹ The overall picture of Islamic history that emerges from this excursus is one of ups and downs, of good and bad rulers, and not only and necessarily that of a straight line steadily descending toward corruption and decay.⁴⁰

The section on *amwāl* concerns both rulers and ruled, writes Ibn Taymiyya. It is upon both parties to give each other what is due. Justice is clearly conceptualized through the idea of an ongoing balance of lawful rights and claims. The sultan and his representatives must give their subjects what they are entitled to, and in turn the subjects must not refuse to give them what is required and they must not ask for what they cannot claim.⁴¹ This ideal order where everybody properly gives and asks according to his own place in society and with the ultimate aim to promote and protect the public good is inspired by the idea that public revenues are not private property and that men in authority are “agents, representatives and trustees, not owners (*fa-innahum umanā' wa-nuwwāb wa-wukalā' laysū mullāk^{an}*).”⁴² They are not to follow their own whims, they are not to behave like kings who give out to whom they love and refuse to whom they hate. The Prophet used to state: “I don't give and I don't refuse. I only distribute and assign according to what I was ordered.”⁴³

Public revenues are of three types: spoils of war (*ghanīma*), alms (*ṣadaqāt*) and *fay'*.⁴⁴ *Ghanīma* is that which was taken from unbelievers by fighting. It should be divided in five parts as according to the Qur'ān (8:41). One fifth for “those mentioned by God” (i.e. the Messenger of God, that is the imam, and his relatives, orphans, the needy and the wayfarer); the rest is for the *ghānimīn*, which, on the basis of a tradition attributed to 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, Ibn Taymiyya defines as those who have witnessed the fight, which means those who went to the battlefield in order to fight, whether they actually fought or not.⁴⁵ Nobody is to receive more than his fellows on account of his origins, leadership or merit (*faḍl*). This statement seems to slightly contradict what comes a few lines afterwards, namely that the imam enjoys the discretionary power to distribute supplementary portions of spoils to those who caused major harm to the enemy.⁴⁶ Finally, those properties seized from the enemies that were once owned by Muslims are to be given back to the initial owners, when possible. Of course, Ibn Taymiyya is well aware that the intricacies of spoils distribution have tormented Islamic legal scholars for quite a while. Yet his purpose is to clarify the general principles, as we have seen. He cuts the technicalities short, which as a matter of fact, also means leaving great discretionary power to the authorities.⁴⁷

Ṣadaqāt, alms, are the second type of revenue and are to be distributed to eight categories of people as according to the Sunna. First the poor and the indigent, who are defined as those who lack sufficient means to live. Those who are self-sufficient (*ghanī*) or able to acquire some subsistence are excluded from this category. Poverty is a material

³⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, *Qā'ida fī al-amwāl al-sultāniyya*, 283–299.

⁴⁰ I am engaging here with Belhaj, *Law and Order*, 400–422.

⁴¹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 45, 46, 47

⁴² *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 46.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Public revenues are a standard topic of governance and administrative textbooks. Cf. for instance al-Māwardī who discusses more extensively than Ibn Taymiyya *zakāt*, *fay'* and *ghanīma*, *jizya* and *kharāj*. Cf. al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sultāniyya*, 177–245. Ibn Jamā'a, *Tahrīr al-aḥkām*, 97ff.

⁴⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 50.

⁴⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 51.

⁴⁷ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 53. Cf. the discussion on *ghanīma* in Henri Laoust, *Essai*, 399–402. Laoust compares some of Ibn Taymiyya's choices with that of Ibn Qudāma (d. 1223) and other scholars of the four Sunni schools of law. In my opinion, Laoust remains a very useful reading.

business, not a spiritual one, Ibn Taymiyya seems to imply polemically.⁴⁸ Other than this, *ṣadaqāt* are for the officers in charge with collecting, guarding and registering taxes; for those whose heart is to be softened (a tricky category which is then discussed under *fay'*); for slaves or prisoners to be freed; for those who are unable to pay their debts; for the military personnel who need assistance to pay for their equipment or to make *ḥajj* (both are subsumed under the *fi sabīl allāh* category); and, finally, for the wayfarer, that is, the person who goes from country to country.⁴⁹

Fay' is the third type of revenue. It is usually understood as what is taken from unbelievers without fighting (the standard reference is Q. 56:6–10). It includes *jizya*, properties agreed upon treaties, gifts sent to the sultan from foreign countries, taxes levied on merchants from territories that do not have a treaty with Muslims (*dār al-ḥarb*), or on *dhimmīs* who go and trade in other countries. *Kharāj* is also included, which is an indication that with time *fay'* also came to comprise money or properties coming from Muslims. For instance, all those properties that do not have a specific owner, such as an inheritance without an heir, or deposits whose depositors are for some reason difficult to identify are *fay'*. Thus, *fay'* becomes in fact the term that indicates “collective wealth” or “revenue.”⁵⁰ Ibn Taymiyya is well aware of changes occurring with time in matters of taxation. He presents a quick sketch of levies in which a most neat condemnation falls upon *mukūs* (miscellaneous or occasional taxes) and upon money levied in place of a *ḥadd* penalty, or retaliation.⁵¹ The example is that of a collective monetary tax on a whole village where a homicide has been committed rather than letting the victim’s relatives request either retaliation or blood money. Despite that such money is taken for the treasury (*li-bayt al-māl*),⁵² Ibn Taymiyya evidently disapproves the overlapping of taxation and punishment, which, in his view, fosters corruption. After this classification, the real questions come. How should all these revenues be spent? And how should they not be spent? It is here that the reader detects a strong critique to the system.

Much of the injustice (*ẓulm*) that happens is both from the part of rulers and the ruled: the former take what is not permissible to take, and the latter refuse to give what is due. Like soldiers and peasants that sometimes do injustice to each other, sometimes people neglect some of the duties of jihad, or men in authority accumulate of the wealth of God what is not permissible to accumulate. The same happens with inflicting punishments upon [not] rendering properties. Sometimes what is permissible (*mā yubāḥu*) or obligatory is neglected; something else that is not permissible (*mā lā yaḥillu*) is carried out. The basic principle is whoever owes some property [or money] [to somebody else] must give it back (*kull 'alayhi māl yajibu adā'uhu*).⁵³

This statement is followed by a cascade of examples. It can be a man in charge with a deposit, somebody participating in sharecropping (*muzāra'a*), a *muḍāraba* transaction or a partnership contract.⁵⁴ It can be the money of an entrusting party (*māl li-muwakkilihi*), that of an orphan, of a *waqf*, or of the public treasury. It can be a debt that the debtor is able to settle but does not. In this case, he will be imprisoned, eventually tortured, until the debt is settled, just as the

⁴⁸ I am indebted to Henri Laoust for this specific point. Laoust, *Essai*, 397.

⁴⁹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 55–56. Cf. Laoust, *Essai*, 397–98.

⁵⁰ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 57–59.

⁵¹ Also Ibn Jamā'a condemns *mukūs* without any space for negotiation, see *Tahrīr al-aḥkām*, 145.

⁵² *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 60. A similar sketch is proposed in *Qā'ida fi amwāl al-sulṭāniyya*, where it is discussed more in detail and in historical perspective, p. 391ff.

⁵³ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 61.

⁵⁴ A *muḍāraba*: “A commercial association whereby an investor (*rabb al-māl*) entrusts capital to an agent (*muḍārib*, *'āmil*) who trades with it and shares with the investor a pre-determined proportion of the profits”. The quote is from Wakin, *Muḍāraba*.

Prophet did in Khaybar with Sa‘ya, the uncle of Ḥuyayy ibn Akḥṭab from the Banū Naḍīr, when Sa‘ya tried to cover his nephew who had hidden his possessions from the Prophet.⁵⁵ The wide array of examples employed here serves the purpose of reminding the reader that the principle is incumbent upon every single member of the community, not on rulers only. Interestingly, from the mid 14th century onwards, the sources register a shift in the administration of debt cases from qāḍīs to *siyāsa* officers with the aim of providing justice, not only Law, or better equity at the expense of the formalism of the Sharī‘a.⁵⁶

As much as justice was previously conceptualized through the notion of rights and claims, injustice now consists in taking (or giving) what is not permissible, or in refusing to give what is due. Accordingly, public officers must not demand gifts (*hadāya*) from ordinary Muslims. Rewards (*muḥābāt*) requested by officers for the accomplishments of certain services have the same status as such gifts, which the just ruler will ask his officers to retribute. When such illicitly taken property cannot be given back to its owner, it will be spent for the common good (paying soldiers, for instance, or equipping frontier areas with horses and weapons).⁵⁷ Good officers must inform those in power (*dhū al-sulṭān*) about the needs and conditions of ordinary people (*al-nās*), and must deflect them from corruption.⁵⁸ Collaboration with those who pursue their own whims is totally off the mark.⁵⁹ Equally strict morals apply to the expenses of public money (*fay’*) which should be employed first and foremost to pay those who operate for “the public utility” (*al-manfa‘a al-‘amma*): soldiers and holders of public offices, that is, judges, scholars, financial officers, the imam leading the prayer, those calling to prayers and so forth. Then, public money is to be employed for necessary public works (dams, bridges, canals, etc.) and then finally for the needy. And Ibn Taymiyya here argues, against other scholars, using again as a precedent ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb’s practice, that the needy are entitled to have from both alms and *fay’*. The two leading criteria for spending public money are then need and utility (*hāja, manfa‘a*). No money is to be given out on the basis of personal ties or for activities which are prohibited: paying effeminate, prostitutes, singers, magicians, astrologers.⁶⁰ Spending money on *ta’līf al-qulūb*, that is to attract unbelievers to Islam or support already obedient Muslims, is

⁵⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 62. Ibn Taymiyya touches on the issue of torturing the suspect when it is known that the illicitly taken property is with him *MF* 35: 406–407 (*bāb al-qaḍā*). Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who significantly expands on this point, possibly takes it from there and not from *al-Siyāsa*. Cf. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *al-Ṭuruq al-ḥukmiyya*, 1: 14–18. The relevant *ḥadīth* can be found in: Abū Da‘wūd, *Sunan*, k. *al-Kharāj wa-l-imāra wa-l-fay’* (kitāb 20), b. *Mā jā‘a fī ḥukm arḍ khaybar* (bāb 24). Ibn Taymiyya refers to al-Bukhārī, who does not report the text: cf. *Ṣaḥīḥ*, k. *al-Shurūṭ* (kitāb 54), b. *Idhā ishtarāta fī al-muzāra‘a: idhā shi‘tu akhrajatuka* (bāb 14). According to al-‘Imrān, Ibn Taymiyya took the text of the *ḥadīth* from al-Ḥumaydī’s (d. 1095), *Jam‘ bayna al-ṣaḥīḥayn*, cf. *Siyāsa shar‘iyya*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 61–62, n. 6.

⁵⁶ See Rapoport: *Royal Justice and Religious Law*, 82–84, 87. Discussing a famous case of unsettled debt described by al-Maqrīzī, Rapoport writes: “The chamberlain punished them, presumably torturing them, until they disclosed the whereabouts of the money that they were hiding” (p. 83). “Them” refers to a group of Cairene merchants owing money to some Persian merchants. Johansen has extensively written on the introduction of torture as a means to obtain a confession. Johansen: *Verité et torture* and idem: *La découverte des choses qui parlent*.

⁵⁷ On this specific point, cf. *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī 66 and *MF*, 28: 592–597, in particular 594–597. Ibn Taymiyya will come back time and again on the importance of restituting illicitly taken properties (debt, theft etc...) and on the idea that whenever it is impossible to identify the original owner, such property is to be spent for the public good. See also his discussion of *muḥārabā*, 108, 110. On the prohibition to accept gifts, see also Māwardī, *Aḥkām*, 196; the context is that of *zakāt* collection.

⁵⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 62–65.

⁵⁹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 65.

⁶⁰ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 69–73. On the prohibition to pay astrologers for their activity, see also Ibn Taymiyya, *MF*, 35: 195 and 197. Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwas on astrology are translated and commented upon by Michot, Ibn Taymiyya, 147–208.

subsumed under “public utility” and is regarded as obligatory.⁶¹ The soundness of these grants, whose corruptive nature Ibn Taymiyya is well aware of, depends on the intention of the giver.⁶² This moralizing tone escalates and pervades the last pages of this section where people are classified in three groups as according to their attitudes toward wealth.⁶³ First of all come the greedy ones who spend for their own interests and personal power (the implicit critique to the system is sweeping), then the prudent, quietist ones who neither spend for themselves nor for the system. Their attitude of general abstinence ends up in restraining them from performing their duties. Disdainful of these groups, which represent the two extremes against which Ibn Taymiyya sets up his own *via media* (*wasat*), the Ḥanbalī scholar identifies as best the third group, which spends money, and does it reasonably, for the public good only. In a nutshell, the pursuit and expenditure of public wealth for any purpose other than advancing the interests of the community is strongly condemned. It is again the notion of common good which sets the parameter for determining the value of human acts.

We do not know whether Ibn Taymiyya’s book was ever read by the ruling elite, by Sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir himself (d. 1341) or somebody of his entourage.⁶⁴ If it was ever, one may well reach the conclusion that the impact of Ibn Taymiyya’s advice in *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* as on the sultan’s financial and recruitment policies must have been close to zero. Bribery, corruption, purchase of posts, disrespect of rules set by predecessors, lavish distribution of *iqṭā‘āt* and grants to secure loyalties, grand expenses for the sultan’s personal pleasures and hobbies are only some of the misdoings that characterized al-Malik al-Nāṣir’s third reign (1310–1341), during which the text was supposedly composed.⁶⁵ The intensity of Ibn Taymiyya’s critique to the system, independent from its readership, is impressive and it becomes even spikier in the following section where the coercive power of political authorities is fully advocated. It is here that the harshest side of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* comes to light.

III. The limits and rights

The limits set by God: punishment, and else

An efficient and effective punishment is an intrinsic element of justice and as such it forms a good part of the third thematic cluster, which revolves around the fixed penalties set by God and on the obligations represented by his rights (*ḥudūd allāh wa-ḥuqūquhu*).⁶⁶ As said above, just as the first part of the treatise unfolded around the Qur’ānic idea of “rendering trusts” (Q. 4:58), the second one revolves around the remaining section of the verse: “And when you judge (or rule) among people, judge (or rule) with fairness” (*‘adl*). But *‘adl*, equity or

⁶¹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 72–73. On *ta’līf al-qulūb* see also p. 111 where public money is to be spent on persuading the leaders of particularly obnoxious gangs of brigands, who assault people to take their properties, to collaborate with justice or prevent further damage.

⁶² *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 73.

⁶³ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 76–77. The passage is discussed by Michael Cook and is in turn commented upon by Anjum (Cook, *Commanding Right*, 157; Anjum, *Politics, Law*, 239–41). It is to be pointed out that Ibn Taymiyya is here classifying people according to their different attitude toward money. More specifically he discusses the rulers’ gifts for reasons of state (the point is well taken by Cook, *ibid.*, n. 93), and not to political authority in general. Later on, at the end of the book, Ibn Taymiyya proposes a similar classification of human beings, but this time his parameter is their attitude toward power. Cf. *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 194–195.

⁶⁴ According to Henri Laoust, in *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* Ibn Taymiyya addresses especially the Sulṭān al-Malik al-Nāṣir. Cf. *Essai*, 98, fn. 2, *Traité*, xii, xxvii–xxix and “Biographie”, 150–151.

⁶⁵ On al-Malik al-Nāṣir’s third reign, see Levanoni, *Turning Point*. Al-Maqrīzī (d. 852/1442), writing some decades later identifies bribery as one an endemic cause of decay. See Allouche, *Mamluk Economics*, 52–53.

⁶⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 79–186 (*al-Qism al-thānī, al-ḥudūd wa-l-ḥuqūq, wa-fīhi bābān. Al-bāb al-awwal: ḥudūd allāh wa- ḥuqūquhu*). *Siyāsa*, ed. Imrān, 83–194. Chapters have no titles in al-‘Imrān’s edition.

fairness, is also the word Ibn Taymiyya employs for justice. Thus, ruling with equity, fairness or “justice” is the lynchpin of the second part of the treatise and a crucial component of Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of “just *siyāsa*.” Indeed “justice,” but only tangentially the judicial.

‘*Adl* entails first of all the due application of the fixed penalties set by God.⁶⁷ In fact, punishment aims at restoring a loss or the rights of those who were deprived of them, and at compensating the damage for a received offense, thus creating a condition of equality and parity.⁶⁸ And finally punishment is also a deterrent from further offenses.⁶⁹ Ibn Taymiyya follows the well-established pattern of *fiqh* literature which has the discussion about the fixed penalties set by God and his rights, which precede those of men (all in all eight chapters each). Thus, the first part (*bāb*) opens with the *ḥudūd* penalties and with a heavy emphasis on not neglecting the application of such penalties, which are part of the “commanding right and forbidding wrong” duty.⁷⁰ This section on *ḥudūd* offenses and God’s rights also includes chapters on discretionary penalties and on jihad. *Ḥudūd* offenses are those concerning the community as a whole. Prosecuting them is among the most pressing duties of men in authority and is to be pursued without waiting for claims to be brought before officials (*yajibu ‘alā al-wulāt al-baḥth ‘anhu wa-iqāmatuhu min ghayr da‘wa aḥad bihi*).⁷¹ The *ratio* behind this sort of recommendation is that of achieving punishments for criminal offenses more effectively. It is in fact well known that the formalistic attitude toward proof typical of *fiqh* also made *ḥudūd* offenses extremely difficult to prove at the time Ibn Taymiyya was writing.⁷²

Ibn Taymiyya begins with swiftly emphasizing points which are typical of the legal treatment of *ḥudūd* penalties, namely that they should not be lifted once brought in front of the relevant authorities, nor pardoned by intercession (*shafā‘a*).⁷³ Consistently, he stresses that it is absolutely prohibited to take money from the offenders in order to cancel the penalty. This kind of money is illicit and immoral (*sukht khabīth*); it is indeed a form of bribery.⁷⁴ The study of chronicles and recent research on the criminal history of the Mamluk period highlight the serious threat to security that brigandage represented.⁷⁵ This situation is reflected in *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* as well where “brigands” (*al-muḥāribūn*) are the category of *ḥudūd* offenders that attract most of Ibn Taymiyya’s attention.⁷⁶ In comparison, theft (*sariqa*), fornication (*zinā*), use of alcohol (*sharb khamr*) and intoxicating substances, and false accusation of fornication (*qadhf*) cover a limited number of pages in both versions of the book.⁷⁷ *Al-muḥāribūn* are those bandits and robbers who raid the countryside or the desert and openly attack people to rob them. In so doing, they may cause the victims’ death. Whole gangs of shady characters (brigands, be they Bedouins among Arabs, Kurds or Turcoman, peasants, dissolute soldiers or even insubordinate gangs of the urban populace) surface from

⁶⁷ Anjum, 241–244 highlights Ibn Taymiyya’s emphasis on justice as “the ultimate political virtue.”

⁶⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 173 discussing the *ratio* of retaliation: *wa-huwa* (i.e. *al-qīṣāṣ*) *al-musāwā wa-l-mu‘ādala*. The passage unfolds as a commentary of Q. 2:178–178 (*kutiba ‘alaykum al-qīṣāṣ...*). See Vasalou, *Ibn Taymiyya’s Ethics*, 51–53 and 243–244. Vasalou (p. 316, fn. 109) remarks that the text of *al-Siyāsa* is a short reprise of the longer treatment of the topic that Ibn Taymiyya carries out in his *tafsīr* of Q. 2:188–189. Vasalou also observes how in this commentary Ibn Taymiyya claims a rational, or natural, ground for the normative force of this prescription (p. 243). Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, *MF*, 14:73–87, in particular 77–79.

⁶⁹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, p. 119, 165, 173.

⁷⁰ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 81–95, 119.

⁷¹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 81.

⁷² See Yossef, Rapoport, in: *Royal Justice and Religious Law*, and Baber Johansen, in: *Signs as Evidence*.

⁷³ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 82–86, 119.

⁷⁴ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 87–88 and following.

⁷⁵ See Petry, *Criminal Underworld*, 47–73. Martel-Thoumian, *Delinquance*, 53–54 although the books consider crime and criminal justice at the end of the Mamluk period.

⁷⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 94–118.

⁷⁷ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 119–136.

the book depicted as a huge cause of disruption, insecurity and impoverishment.⁷⁸ Such disruption of the public order is to be repressed. In order for this to happen, rulers must apply the right form of *ḥadd* penalty.⁷⁹ When the offenders are not seized, they will have to be fought with the best of all possible means. A whole chapter is dedicated to the duty of fighting brigands.⁸⁰ War is therefore also part of this punishment-oriented logic, as remarked by Baber Johansen.⁸¹ By using analogy and keeping the definition of *ḥirāba* very general as an aggression carried out in order to rob somebody or as an attack that brings about the general disruption of the public order, Ibn Taymiyya is able to extend its punishment to certain patterns of aggressions that do not necessarily take place in an open space, such as assaults and thefts in homes, secretly premeditated killing (*al-qatl ghīlatan*), or even regicide, whose status as *ḥirāba* remains a matter of disagreement among scholars, he writes.⁸² Similarly, when discussing the *ḥadd* penalty for drinking intoxicants, Ibn Taymiyya tends to keep the discussion short and provide generic definitions on the authority of the Prophet:

Traditions on this subject are plenty and widespread. The Messenger of God subsumed under the same category (*jama‘a*) — according to the principles he was provided with (*bimā ūtiyahu min jawāmi‘ al-kalām*) — every substance that obscures reason and intoxicates. He did not make a difference between this and that ... They are all forbidden.⁸³

The issue in question here is hashish consumption. Significantly, Ibn Taymiyya also eludes the intricate discussion of *shubhas*, yet another device that fulfills the goal of easing the application of *ḥudūd* penalties. In *fiqh* literature, *ḥadd* penalties are neutralized by an element of “ambiguity” or “uncertainty” which is called *shubha*. A *shubha* is what makes the prohibited act resemble a permissible one. The jurists argue that the intervention of this element of doubt invalidates the penalty. Of course, they discuss the single cases and often do not agree, but share the idea that this notion of “ambiguity” operates because it is grounded on a prophetic precedent that instructs believers to “avert the *ḥadd* penalties by means of ambiguous cases” (*idra‘ū al-ḥudūd bi-l-shubuhāt*).⁸⁴ In other words, a *shubha* repels the *ḥadd* penalty because it brings forth an unforeseen circumstance that uncovers the internal weakness of the norm. Again, sidestepping the intricacies of ambiguous cases not only conforms to Ibn Taymiyya’s initial proposition of staying general, but also entails that whenever such cases arise they can be dealt with by the respective public officers with a good degree of discretion. The restitution of stolen property remains a major concern in these chapters too. Cooperation and complicity with delinquency is a cause of social corruption and as such is also heavily targeted.⁸⁵ The previously mentioned principle that imprisonment and beating are the means to be used to obtain a confession about the whereabouts of a certain amount of stolen money is now applied not only to the debtor refusing to pay off a debt he is capable of settling, but to all aggressors refusing to give back illicitly taken property, as well as to all their accomplices who do not reveal where the stolen objects are or where the ones

⁷⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 97, see also 88.

⁷⁹ Specifically on Ibn Taymiyya’s treatment of banditry in his *Siyāsa*, Khaled Abou El Fadl, *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 276–277.

⁸⁰ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 107–118.

⁸¹ Johansen, *Perfect Law*, 276. When discussing the various ways of executing the death penalty, al-‘Imrān’s edition has a supplementary passage on killing by burning (*tahriq*) which is missing from the Ḥarastānī’s edition. Cf. *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 106–107. Ibn Taymiyya does not take a stand on the issue. He only briefly explains that *tahriq* is a matter of *ikhtilāf* among scholars.

⁸² *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 103–105.

⁸³ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 135.

⁸⁴ For a thoughtful discussion of this matter, see Fierro, *Idra‘ū l-ḥudūd*, 208–38. Rowson in: *Shubha*. Rabb in *Legal Maxims*, and now also, *Doubt*.

⁸⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 113–118.

responsible are hiding.⁸⁶ Discretionary penalties (chap. 7) are part of the system and concern all those infractions (*ma'āṣī*) for which there is no fixed penalty. Three factors impact on the harshness of a discretionary penalty: the reputation of the offender, the gravity of the offense and its frequency.⁸⁷ Once again, rulers enjoy a high degree of discretion in choosing the type of penalty. Such penalty can be capital when the crime cannot otherwise be stopped and the offender is likened to somebody who disrupts public order (*mufsid fī al-arḍ*).⁸⁸

The last chapter (chap. 8) of this section is on jihad. It is a peculiar chapter. Out of twenty-five pages (in Ḥarastānī), less than a half are effectively dedicated to war.⁸⁹ This is not what one would expect from the belligerent Ibn Taymiyya, and this is not what we usually read about *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*.⁹⁰ Fighting is, first of all, a form of punishment for domestic enemies, meaning offenders who have not been seized. They consist of groups of rebellious Muslims (*tā'ifa/tawā'if mumtani'a* is the recurrent expression). These can be either Muslim dissidents refusing to comply with clear and authoritative religious prescriptions, or brigands violating people's lives and properties, hence disrupting the public order. While Ibn Taymiyya dealt with the latter category in the preceding chapter,⁹¹ whoever is familiar with his *fatāwā* against dissident Muslim minorities knows that the refusal to abide by the major duties of Islam is the leading argument Ibn Taymiyya uses to justify war against these groups of people.⁹² While this principle is clearly enunciated in these pages of *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*,⁹³ in a cursory but nonetheless interesting passage Ibn Taymiyya explains how to deal with groups "who do not rebel" (*ghayr mumtani'in*) and who live in the territory of Islam but neglect the obligatory religious duties, such as prayer. Here, refusal (*imtinā'*) is not identical with rebellion. These people must be forced to perform religious duties; eventually they will be put to death if they refuse to do so, especially if they acknowledge the obligatory character of such rituals, but they will not be fought.⁹⁴ This passage is puzzling. It seems at odds with the many texts about fighting Muslim minorities in volumes 28 and 35 of the *Majmū' al-fatāwā* where the refusal to comply with prescribed religious duties is the pivot of the pro-jihad argument against disobedient Muslims. On the contrary, the passage in question implies that the lack of compliance with religious duties is a sufficient but non-necessary condition for waging jihad, the necessary condition being political insubordination. The classical precedent of the Khawārij is in fact not incidental.⁹⁵ This passage also suggests that *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya* may have been written in a moment free from war pressure since it

⁸⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 108, 110, 112–115. Interestingly at page 110, Ibn Taymiyya does not ground his argument on the Hadith about Sa'ya's claim that the possessions of his nephew had all gone (cf. p. 62), but on Q. 4:34 where the husband is allowed to beat his wife when she does not comply with her duties.

⁸⁷ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 137–138. On reputation also 166–168. Compare with Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya*, 358–361. Al-Māwardī's treatment of the topic is more detailed and focused on *ikhṭilāf*. He also deals with the possibility of pardon or intercession for offenses requiring a discretionary penalty, but the criteria for applying *ta'zīr* and deciding on its entity are entirely the same (cf. *Aḥkām*, 358).

⁸⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 139–140. The position of Mālik admitting the death penalty for certain crimes is mentioned, in particular his admissibility of killing the Qadariyya for their being a cause of public disturbance (p. 139). The death penalty for magicians (*sāḥir*) is also reported as an example (p. 140).

⁸⁹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 143–153.

⁹⁰ For instance, Johansen, *Perfect Law*, 276: "Prayer and war according to Ibn Taymiyya are the supreme political forms of religion" and 281; Fons, *Mongols*, 31–68, in particular 55: "Le chapitre consacré au djihad, dans la *Siyāsa sar'iyya* est particulièrement parlant."

⁹¹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 107–108.

⁹² The classic example in the Taymiyyan corpus are the *fatāwā* against the Mongols, *MF* 28: 502–503, 510–511, 545, 546. On these texts, see Denise Aigle, *The Mongol Invasions*.

⁹³ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 93, 149–150, 151 and 152.

⁹⁴ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 153. Compare with Māwardī, *Aḥkām*, 338–39 where Māwardī deals with the person who does not perform ritual prayer. Al-Māwardī's discussion provides details of juristic disagreement. Ibn Taymiyya gets away with the issue in nine lines.

⁹⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 150–151.

does not display the uncompromising fury and apologetic character that other Taymiyyan writings on the same topic do, as Henri Laoust also observed a long time ago.⁹⁶ On the contrary, it has been recently pointed out that exhorting the Mamluks to fight against the Mongols was the main concern of Ibn Jamā‘a’s treatise.⁹⁷ The other type of jihad is the classic one against the infidel enemy (*kuffār*) and does not seem to particularly attract Ibn Taymiyya’s attention. Moreover, the unbeliever’s unbelief (*kufr*) that does not hinder Muslims from practicing their religion will be a source of damage exclusively to himself.⁹⁸

Both types of war can be offensive or defensive, but the defensive one is clearly the issue for Ibn Taymiyya. Contributing or participating in a defensive war is in fact a duty incumbent upon every single Muslim. In contrast, participating in an offensive war is a voluntary act and a collective duty, which means that the whole of the community is exempted from it once the duty is carried out by a sufficient number of people.⁹⁹ All these considerations, which typically are of legal nature, are preceded by a cluster of exhortative materials on jihad made of Qur’ānic verses, Hadith and rational, as in commonsensible, arguments (... *ẓāhir al-i‘tibār*),¹⁰⁰ such as: Jihad is the most useful religious duty both in this life and the next because it encompasses all forms of interior and exterior worship and always carries with itself one of the two good actions, either victory or death as a martyr and paradise; and since we all live and die, living and dying in jihad is living and dying in the utmost bliss. Once more, what defines the ethical value of this specific obligation is its overall utility.¹⁰¹ The scriptural and non-scriptural materials which are located at the opening of the chapter display a genuine mobilizing and motivating function. The remaining pages of the chapter deploy a variety of reflections of ethical and practical nature. They are sensibly longer in al-‘Imrān’s edition, which not only provides more scriptural materials in support of the arguments,¹⁰² but also displays a final part of the chapter which is totally missing in the other text.¹⁰³ The discourse switches here from the exhortative tone and concrete legal preoccupations of the previous pages to an ethical level. This section of the chapter touches on the importance of accomplishing religious duties, on the rulers’ obligation to care about their subjects’ material and spiritual life, on the virtues that are most helpful for such a task (*ikhhlāṣ* and *tawakkul*, *iḥsān* and *ṣabr*) and on the acts of worship (*ṣalāt* and *zakāt*) that allow such virtues to be practiced and cultivated and that nourish the moral integrity (*ṣalāḥ*) of both ruler and subjects.¹⁰⁴ Hence, “just *siyāsa*” is not exclusively about the rulers’ and their agents’ coercion, or monopoly of violence. Men in authority are instructed to be patient and gentle in words to ease their subjects’ hardships.¹⁰⁵ In fact, human beings accept justice (*al-ḥaqq*) only when it tends to the fulfillment of their pleasures or desires (*ḥuẓūẓihā*), which, according to Ibn Taymiyya, coincide with their needs. Such fulfillment of human needs is also an integral component of man’s worship of and obedience to God. The example is that of drinking, eating and clothing. These are needs and desires which serve ritual performance, for without food, drink and clothes, no ritual obligation could ever be carried out. The result is that the

⁹⁶ Laoust, *Essai*, 98, n. 2.

⁹⁷ Anjum, Ibn Jamā‘a. I thank Mustafa Banister for drawing my attention to this point.

⁹⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 143, 149.

⁹⁹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 152–153,

¹⁰⁰ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 143–147.

¹⁰¹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 147: *fa-innā naf‘ al-jihād āmm li-fā‘ilihi wa-li-ghayrihi fī al-dīn wa-l-dunyā ... wal-l-jihād anfa‘ fī himā min kull ‘amal shadīd.*

¹⁰² For instance, compare Ḥarastānī, p. 164 to al-‘Imrān, pp. 178–179 where a series of Hadith and Qur’anic verses in support of the argument are quoted.

¹⁰³ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 154–168; *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 166–191; the portion of text that runs from page 188, l. 4 (from below) to page 191 is not in Ḥarastānī.

¹⁰⁴ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 155–160.

¹⁰⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 161.

means to fulfill obligatory ends are also obligatory.¹⁰⁶ According to this standpoint, spending for one's self and one's own family is a priority and an individual duty.¹⁰⁷ In a similar perspective, but elsewhere, precisely in his writing on *ḥisba*, Ibn Taymiyya allows those in power to control prices under circumstances that produce unfairness. The prices of items necessary for ritual performance or fulfillment of religious duties (equipment for *hajj* or water for *tahāra*) are also to be controlled to make sure that ordinary people are enabled to observe their ritual and religious obligations.¹⁰⁸

Enjoying permissible pleasures is also highly recommended, for again they help accomplish one's duties.¹⁰⁹ More, what is pleasurable is useful, and by pursuing what is pleasurable within the limits of the law, man pursues what benefits him. Again, in very synthetic terms, Ibn Taymiyya presents a *summa* of his utilitarian ethical vision, one where what is useful and beneficial, especially at a communal level, is also ethically good; and one where the spiritual and material well-being of the individual is functional to that of the whole: "God originally created pleasures and desires to achieve the communal welfare of his creatures, for by those means they attract what benefits them."¹¹⁰ If means are functional to ends, if punishments were revealed (*shuri'at*) to restrain people from prohibited acts and to invite them to obligatory ones, then equally prescribed and necessary (*fa-qad shuri'at ayḍan . . . fa-yanbaghī*) is whatever is meant to support good and prevent evil. The verb *shuri'at* is important. It puts emphasis on the authority of such prescriptions: prophetic Hadith mainly, Qur'ānic verses and Companions' deeds. It is specifically when it comes to precautionary measures (*al-ḥadhr*) that the longer *Siyāsa* has something important to say; important because it helps reconstruct a more thorough vision of Ibn Taymiyya's project as formulated in this work. Both versions of the texts provide examples of how to encourage good and prevent evil, and both state that while *ḥudūd* penalties can be applied only when the wrong is proved (*illā bi-l-bayyina*), precautionary measures are exempted from the severe limitations of evidence.¹¹¹ This point is particularly significant, for the legitimization of precautionary provisos with a view to protect the public good also empowers the discretionary power of rulers. It is a point that will be fully taken by subsequent understandings of the concept of *siyāsa shar'iyya*, starting with Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and his long treatise on proof and evidence.¹¹²

Yet, in the pages missing from the shorter *Siyāsa*, Ibn Taymiyya goes on and locates in the ruler and the religious scholar (*al-wālī wa-l-'ālim*) the authorities responsible for identifying evil (*sharr*), its causes and signs (*'alāmāt*). The metaphor of the physician is used to describe their task. By attaining knowledge of evil, its signs and causes, rulers and scholars protect society. These are solicited to acquire expertise (*khibra*) with different expressions of evil: unbelief, depravation, "the conditions of the enemies in their religious and worldly matters" (*yanbaghī li-l-wālī wa-l-'ālim an yakūn khabīran bi-l-sharr . . .*), so that they can cure the heart of its diseases (the imagery here is Qur'ānic). Such diseases consist of corrupted morals (*al-akhlāq al-radiyya*), and when morality is involved the '*ulamā*' are as

¹⁰⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 161–162.

¹⁰⁷ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 162 and 163. Cf. also Ibn Taymiyya, *MF*, 20: 151.

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF*, 28: 75–79.

¹⁰⁹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 162–164.

¹¹⁰ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 164. See Vasalou, *Ibn Taymiyya's Ethics*, in particular 42–46, 73, 84–92, on what is ethically good, on an individual and communal level, and its direct relation with pleasure and benefits.

¹¹¹ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 167–168; *Siyāsa*, ed. al-'Imrān, 187–188.

¹¹² Cf. for instance on the issue of *istifāda* (good or bad reputation) in judicial testimony. Ibn Taymiyya only briefly states that *istifāda* is sufficient to exclude somebody from testimony. Ibn al-Qayyim reprises the matter and expands it to the point of considering bad or good *istifāda* as valid forms of proof in judicial procedure. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Turuq*, ed. Nāyif ibn Aḥmad al-Ḥamad, Mecca: Dār 'ālam al-fawā'id li-l-nashr wa-l-tawzī', 1428AH [2007], 535–537.

well.¹¹³ In a sentence at odds with the initial pages of the book where we saw force (*quwwa*) being one of the mandatory prerogatives for an effective practice of authority, Ibn Taymiyya explains that: “Conducting (*siyāsa*) by personal discernment (*raʿy*) and expertise (*khibra*) is greater and more useful than conducting by bravery and force.”¹¹⁴ The reason, he writes, is that knowledge (*ʿilm*) is an attribute of perfection (*ṣifat kamāl*) and what is benefitted by it is either preferable or obligatory. Nonetheless, while men of authority are definitively encouraged to know and identify evil and its causes, they are equally instructed to avoid punishing sins (*dhunūb*) when they know that these damage only their perpetrator. And when they do not punish such reprehensible actions, they should also avoid showing that they are aware of them, since this provokes useless disorders.¹¹⁵

This consideration takes us to a final point to be made regarding these pages which are not in the shorter *Siyāsa*, one that brings our attention to and highlights the collective dimension that Ibn Taymiyya has so far privileged. Once again, the author’s concerns are projected beyond the individual level following a line of thought that encourages not to make public what ought to be concealed.¹¹⁶ These pages are also significant for two other reasons. First, in them Ibn Taymiyya anticipates that ideal pact of cooperation between scholars and (undefined) political authorities which otherwise crops up only at the very end of the text. This pact of cooperation is a distinctive trait of his vision of government according to the religious normativity, as also previously underlined by Baber Johansen in a much more circumstantial reading of the treatise.¹¹⁷ By doing so, Ibn Taymiyya leaves no doubt about which social groups are to be invested by the “healing” power he has just described. Furthermore, by setting at the center of the stage a generic elite composed of *ʿulamāʾ* and *wūlāt*, the text suggests that very likely these were the social groups that are addressed in this famous treatise of his which, contrary to Ibn Taymiyya’s usual style, unfolds neatly without major digressions nor vehement polemical invectives.

And the rights of God?

The first part [of this second section of the book] [is about] the duties and rights which are not for specific individuals. Their utility (*manfaʿa*) is for all Muslims, or for a certain kind of them. All Muslims need them. These are named the fixed penalties set by God and the rights of God.¹¹⁸

These words occur at the very beginning of the second *qism* of the book. We have observed how this second part of *al-Siyāsa al-shariʿiyya* sets off to explore the *ḥudūd* and *ḥuqūq* of God. As a matter of fact, it is only Ibn Taymiyya’s long treatment of *ḥudūd* (together with discretionary penalties and *jihad*) that we have so far encountered. However, did not Ibn Taymiyya propose that he would discuss the *ḥuqūq* of God as well? The question is a legitimate one, for the shorter text of *al-Siyāsa* shifts straightaway from the composite chapter

¹¹³ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-ʿImrān, 188–190 (quotation from page 188) and Q. 2:10, 5:52, 8:49, 9:12, 22:53 *et passim*.

¹¹⁴ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-ʿImrān, 190.

¹¹⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-ʿImrān, 190–191.

¹¹⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-ʿImrān, 190–191. According to Christian Lange this is an attitude that seems to have developed by scholars specifically during the Seljuk period as a reaction to intrusive *muḥtasib*’s activity. See Lange, *Changes of Hisba under the Seljuqs*.

¹¹⁷ Johansen in *A Perfect Law* stresses that Ibn Taymiyya viewed political power as a condition for the survival of religious life (p. 286 specifically). He also puts forth a highly circumstantial reading of the text according to which Ibn Taymiyya tried to provide Mamluk rule with religious legitimacy through his doctrine of *siyāsa sharʿiyya* (p. 261). Such a circumstantial reading is rejected by Anjum, *Politics, Law and Community*, 30–31. According to Anjum, the complexity of Ibn Taymiyya’s political thought can be understood only within the broader context of his epistemological and theological vision. On this point, I agree with Anjum.

¹¹⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarāstānī, 81.

on jihad to individual rights and duties, which will be illustrated below. Where are, then, the *ḥuqūq allāh*? The *ḥuqūq allāh* are missing in the shorter *Siyāsa*, but present in the long one. These pages are critical because through them, for the first time in the book, the reader gains an insight into Ibn Taymiyya's idea of *siyāsa sharī'iyya*; a concept which, despite all, remains somewhat undefined throughout the treatise.

Ḥuqūq allāh, Ibn Taymiyya explains:

is a name that comprises everything in which there is a common utility (*manfa'a 'amma*) not specifically concerning a determined individual, or repulsion of a common damage in what pertains to religious or worldly matters, like the supervision of mosques, their imams and *mu'adhdhinīn*, of waqfs, streets and estates (*dīyā'*), or the revivification of prophetic customs (*sunan*) and the eradication (*imāta*) of misguiding innovations, [like] giving precedence to [the one] who makes good use of this or to others among the best of people, the companions of religion and religious knowledge, the pious and God-fearing ones among all sorts of people, [and like] avoiding sinners and transgressors, the treacherous, liars and impostors, and else among the common benefits (*al-maṣāliḥ al-'amma*).¹¹⁹

Having defined the meaning of *ḥuqūq allāh* as every sphere of action and every type of person in which and by whom common utility is promoted, Ibn Taymiyya proceeds into a brief historical excursus in which he tells us that the Prophet would undertake all the tasks (relating to the public good) by himself, occasionally delegating some of them. After him, the Rightly Guided Caliphs would appoint qāḍīs who consulted with them in cases of doubt, but after them things diversified and began to change. As a result, some of these matters were managed by the military authority, which is identified by Ibn Taymiyya with the *shurṭa*, some were managed by the *muḥtasib* and some by the qāḍī. What Ibn Taymiyya is here trying to tell his interlocutors is that with time the prerogatives of public offices changed, depending on historical circumstances, lexical conventions and the abilities of the single officers. Such offices have never been defined by the *sharī'a*.¹²⁰ People, he explains, erroneously overlap the Law with the concept of "religious normativity." Because of this misunderstanding, they came to think that the only public office that is concerned with religious normativity is that of the qāḍī:

Things are not like this. Rather, the religious normativity (*shar'*) is a name that applies to what of the Book and wisdom (*ḥikma*) God the Highest sent His Messenger Muḥammad with. The ruling that derives from it is binding on all men. Every man in authority (*wālī*) is to conform to this religious normativity.¹²¹

A few lines before he had uncompromisingly stated that

Every aspect of public functions in which one acts in obedience to God and his Messenger is an office in accordance to the religious normativity (*wilāyat shar'iyya*). Every aspect in which one acts contrary to it or in which what is obligatory is omitted is not in conformity with the religious normativity (*lam takun shar'iyyat^{am}*).¹²²

These passages are a decisive key to Ibn Taymiyya's understanding of *siyāsa sharī'iyya*. Ibn Taymiyya briefly elucidates the pivotal concept of *shar'* and how this fully applies to the world of public charges. These words also explain why Ibn Taymiyya is not interested in the

¹¹⁹ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-'Imrān, 191–192.

¹²⁰ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-'Imrān, 192–194.

¹²¹ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-'Imrān, 193.

¹²² *Ibid.*

institution of the caliphate, in its legitimacy, nor in any other specific governmental, military, religious or administrative institution. It is not important which officer does what, but how and with what aims each officer acts.¹²³ It is worth noting that the Ḥanbalī scholar expresses a very similar position in his treatise on *ḥisba*, which once again may explain not only why the two texts were bound together in the same codex, but also why these passages were taken off in the shorter version of the text.¹²⁴

IV. Rights and duties of single individuals

So far, Ibn Taymiyya's spotlight has been on the communal dimension as exemplified by the notions of *ḥudūd* and *ḥuqūq* of God. Yet, the last part of the treatise focuses on the rights and duties of the single individual, or better on *ḥudūd* penalties concerning the particular individual and his own rights. Hence, ruling with fairness, equity and justice is not only a matter of punishment and jihad. The care for the communal welfare that distinguishes Ibn Taymiyya's view of "ethical leadership" also engages with certain aspects of the single individual's life. It is yet another piece of the puzzle. The section on individual rights and duties is divided into eight chapters as well, like the one which precedes it, in an intended symmetrical construction which possibly also entails a balance of thematic significance. The emphasis remains on the Qur'ānic verse: "And when you judge (or rule) among people, judge (or rule) with fairness." Despite its title (*al-Ḥudūd wa-l-ḥuqūq li-ādami mu'ayyan*), the focus goes well beyond punishments.¹²⁵ Once more, the concern for the sustainability of ordinary people's lives, a remarkable feature of Ibn Taymiyya's thought in general, emerges with particular force and more prominently in the longer version of the text. It is then again important to take into consideration the edition of Muḥammad al-'Imrān.

The opening chapter is about the necessity of applying retaliation (*qawd*) to the category of killing envisaged by the law. The subject attracts Ibn Taymiyya's concern. One can get a glimpse of how homicide cases often went out of control, the victim's family perpetrating savage private revenge on the offender's relatives, even after the punishment had been meted out.¹²⁶ It is again the disruption of public order provoked by such actions that disturbs Ibn Taymiyya. It is in the chapters on marital law (*al-abdā'*) and transactions (chap. 5 and 6) that once again the longer version of the text shows significant additions to the "vulgate." In the chapter on marital law, barely one page in the text edited by Ḥarastāni, Ibn Taymiyya provides a very concise spectrum of controversial issues he also debates elsewhere, in less-known texts. In this chapter, Ibn Taymiyya is mainly concerned with the changes in wedding transactions that become visible in the legal literature and documents of the time, as Yossef Rapoport demonstrated in his book on marriage and divorce in Medieval Islam. In particular, Ibn Taymiyya is critical of the practice of designating the deferrable portion (*al-mu'akhkhar*, or *al-mu'ajjal*) of the marriage gift (*al-ṣadāq*) not as a sum to be paid to the wife in case a separation due to divorce or the husband's death, but as a due debt (*ḥāll*) payable upon demand. He is also troubled by the monetization of the *nafaqa*, or marital support. Usually due from husbands in kind, from the beginning of the 14th century payment in the form of daily allowances became increasingly widespread. Both changes allowed an empowerment of women. They challenged a "patriarchal ideal of conjugal harmony" and, in

¹²³ Cf. also Baber Johansen in *Signs as Evidence*, 184–185 and in *Perfect Law*, 268–269.

¹²⁴ Ibn Taymiyya, *MF*, 68–67 (*ḥisba*). The passage from the *ḥisba* is well known and has been quoted by many scholars. For instance, Frank Vogel, *Islamic Law and Legal Systems*, 227.

¹²⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. 'Imrān has no title.

¹²⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastāni, 173, 175. More on homicide cases in the legal doctrine and daily life of that period in Carl Petry, *Criminal Underworld*, 203–251. Apparently, punishment by way of retaliation and blood-money was very little applied.

the eyes of somebody like Ibn Taymiyya, of course also a determined ideal of social order.¹²⁷ It is fascinating that such matters, usually brought before qādīs, ended up in a book which is usually considered to be on good governance, jihad and the coercive power of the state.¹²⁸

The chapter on transactions, again extremely brief in Ḥarastānī, is very lively in the long version of the text, where Ibn Taymiyya expands on a series of issues he also discusses in his *Precept on ḥisba*. As already suggested, this explains why the unknown scribe of the Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā copied the text together with the *Qā’ida fī al-ḥisba*.¹²⁹ As mentioned before, *al-Ḥisba*, which modern scholars consider as one of the “political writings” of Ibn Taymiyya, was perceived as a next of kin to *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* already in the 14th century. The section on *ḥisba* in Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s *al-Ṭuruq al-ḥukmiyya* supports this point.¹³⁰

In addition to giving a list of prohibited transactions, which is also in Ḥarastānī, and reminding his reader that it is upon the man of authority (*wālī al-amr*) to promote the prohibition of such transactions, in this chapter Ibn Taymiyya also ventures in a description of different types of fraud, or cheating (*ghishsh*), which he describes as selling items which are outwardly different from what they are inwardly.¹³¹ *Ghishsh* includes counterfeiting coins (*kasr al-sikka*) and selling products obtained by alchemy (*al-kimyā’*). Alchemy is the art of transforming base metals into precious metals, usually silver or gold;¹³² accordingly, Ibn Taymiyya writes: “Alchemy is to produce what looks like gold and silver, or likewise what looks like precious stones, musk perfume (*ṭīb min al-misk*), saffron, amber and so forth.”¹³³ Alchemy challenges God’s distinctive power of creation by deluding men that they can also create; but men fabricate (*ṣ.n.*), they do not create (*kh.l.q*). Alchemy is similar to *al-sīmīyā’*: “Which is sorcery (*sihr*) that induces imagining a given thing differently from what it is.”¹³⁴ Leaving aside theological considerations, the reason for the prohibition of selling substances or items obtained by way of alchemy is that they are in the end the outcome of a high-quality counterfeiting process (*al-zaghal al-jayyid*), hence, a form of cheating. Reproaching and punishing such cheaters is an important duty of men of authority. Jurists—Ibn Taymiyya writes—have not dealt with this matter before.¹³⁵

Finally, men of authority are reminded to supervise the holders of the *ḥisba* office so that they properly perform their job when they enter into matters of pricing and cheating. In a nice closing passage, Ibn Taymiyya apologizes for this digression, explaining that “Nowadays many of the complaints (*shakwā*) from single individuals regard judgment among people in matters of money and adjudication.”¹³⁶ On the whole, these pages challenge the ritualistic and formulaic character of much governance literature and show the extent to which Ibn Taymiyya dynamically engages in the social and economic life of his time. Nothing of it

¹²⁷ “A patriarchal ideal of conjugal harmony” is from Rapoport, *Marriage*, 52.

¹²⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 210–216, in particular 211–214. Ibn Taymiyya, *MF* 34:77–88 (*bāb al-naḥqāt*). All this is missing from *Siyāsa* where he only mentions twice that the *nafaqa* is according to convention (*bi-l-ma’rūf*), ed. Ḥarastānī, 183. See the discussion in: Rapoport, *Marriage*, 51–68.

¹²⁹ Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā, ff. 77r–89v.

¹³⁰ Ibn al-Qayyim, *al-Ṭuruq al-ḥukmiyya*, 2:620 ff. The section on *ḥisba* is highly indebted to Ibn Taymiyya, but never devoid of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s own insights.

¹³¹ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 221. Cf. also *MF*, 28: 72 (*Qā’ida fī al-ḥisba*).

¹³² Again, here and in what follows, Ibn Taymiyya produces a highly synthetic view on the nature, purpose and legitimacy of alchemy, which he discusses at length elsewhere, in: *MF*, 29: 368–388 and 389–391 (*bāb al-khiyār*). For an overview on alchemy, cf. Forster, *Alchemy*.

¹³³ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 223.

¹³⁴ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 223, 224, 225.

¹³⁵ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 223 and 225.

¹³⁶ *Siyāsa*, ed. al-‘Imrān, 217–226, quotations from 223, 225, 226. On counterfeiting coins by means of diluting metal, Stilt, *Islamic Law*, 176–181.

appears in the shorter *Siyāsa*.¹³⁷ A final look at the last two chapters is in order. They are famous and, mostly, what we find summarized in secondary literature about Ibn Taymiyya's *al-Siyāsa al-shar'iyya*. They close the book full circle, bringing the reader back to the ethical outlook that opened it. Interestingly enough, these two chapters are not about *fiqh*, not even that sort of simplified *fiqh* we find in many portions of the book. They are of advisory and exhortatory nature. As such they display a completely different character from the previous six chapters. Still, they are kept within this whole section of the text that discusses men's rights and duties. The penultimate chapter (chap. 7) lingers on the necessity of mutual consultation (*mushāwara*), and the very last (chap. 8) on the indispensability of power (*imāra*, *sultān*) as the means to support religion in this world.¹³⁸

Men in authority cannot do without consulting. This is what the Prophet did all the time when he was unsure about how to act. Whom they are to consult is not so clear. The text remains generic. Indication is given that, among the consultations received, the man in authority must choose the one which is closest to the Book and the Sunna. According to Ibn Taymiyya, those who possess authority (*ulū al-amr*) are the emirs and the 'ulamā'. This statement resembles the one we have seen before, except that here the generic *wūlāt* of the previous pages is turned into a more specific and circumstantial *umarā'*, which is more specifically the Mamluk military emirs holding power in Ibn Taymiyya's time. These are to act in obedience to the Book and the Sunna. Whenever problematic situations arise, knowledge of scriptural indications is an obligation. However, this straightforward prescription (which, by the way, also suggests that those who have command of these scriptural *corpora* be the recipients of the rulers' request for consultation)¹³⁹ is immediately softened by the idea that obligations are compulsory only within the limits of everybody's capabilities.

The last chapter is even better known. It gradually unfolds as a lecture on the foundation and the necessity of power with an escalating preaching tone toward the end. Reason, scripture and experience (*tajriba*) are the sources of the argument, which is thus supported by a composite set of epistemological tools. Since people live in society, the common good and their needs will be fulfilled only through mutual cooperation; this is the rational argument. Groups (society) must always have a leader; the source for such statement is "scriptural," namely Hadiths quoted to support this idea. This passage closely resembles, albeit presented more synthetically, the opening pages of the *Qā'ida fī al-ḥisba*.¹⁴⁰ Commanding right and forbidding wrong, promoting justice and complying with religious obligations are the ultimate objectives of political functions. These will be met only when enforced by strength and command (*quwwa wa-imāra*). This invocation of force as the indispensable tessera for the mosaic to be complete and for things to work properly reminds us of the beginning of the book. Here, it develops as a commentary to the reported traditions, but it also paves the way to the third kind of epistemological source, which is *tajriba*.

Tajriba, experience, is an empirical form of knowledge. From repeated experience over time, men have learned that corruption, disorder, and loss of common interests result from lack of leadership.¹⁴¹ In this perspective, the rather generic function of providing counsel

¹³⁷ *Siyāsa*, ed. Harastānī, 175–176.

¹³⁸ *Siyāsa*, ed. Harastānī, 187–190; 191–198 to be compared with *Siyāsa*, ed. al-'Imrān, 227–231; 232–243.

¹³⁹ This is corroborated by a passage from his book on judgeship in which Ibn Taymiyya writes that when those in power do not have command of the practice of the Prophet or of the Salaf, they must be supported and advised by the experts in the field. This is what the Rightly Guided Caliphs did: when they were unsure about something, they consulted the *Ṣaḥāba* (*MF*, 35: 384–85). On *mushāwara* see also Ibn Jamā'a, although much briefer. Ibn Jamā'a is clear that the 'ulamā' are the ones who give advice to the rulers. Cf. *Tahrīr*, 72.

¹⁴⁰ *MF*, 28: 61–68 (*ḥisba*); in particular p. 62–65

¹⁴¹ What *tajriba* consists of is explained only in the longer version of *Siyāsa*, ed. al-'Imrān, 233. According to Vasalou, Ibn Taymiyya heavily draws on the resources of the philosophers when addressing the notion of

to men in authority mentioned in the previous chapter acquires more meaning. Providing counsel to rulers is conceived as a contribution to the proper functioning of the “public good”; it should not be a way to advance one’s own worldly aspirations, but an opportunity to get closer to God. In a similar perspective, the function of all *wilāyāt* is to command right and forbid wrong, promote justice (‘*adl*) and help man get closer to God. As a result, despite that men were created equal, in the end, “It is inevitable according to reason and religion (*lā budda fī al-‘aql wa-l-dīn* ...) that some men be above others.”¹⁴² Experience is here excluded as an empirical source for justifying the necessary superiority of some over others. Be that as it may, the challenge is to not abuse power and money, but to make sure that both resources are devoted to the implementation of God’s will in this world, which is for the benefit of all. *Al-Dunyā yakhdimu al-dīn*: “The world is at service of religion.” This lapidary statement occurs toward the very end of the treatise.¹⁴³ Yet, the whole of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* demonstrates that, without a proper management of *dunyā*, religion would not be granted its appropriate place in this world. Ultimately, thus, Ibn Taymiyya’s treatise outlines a symbiotic relationship between man and God, or perhaps between worldly power and God, whose logical implication, as paradoxical as it can sound, is that both are in need of each other.

5. Conclusion

The initial questions put forth in the title of this paper were, one or two versions of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* of Ibn Taymiyya? And what do they tell us? Let us start from the first question. As far as I could examine so far, we definitively have in front of us two versions of the treatise. One is sensibly longer than the other which, for some reason, enjoyed wider transmission. The shorter version may be an abridgement of the long one since it is usually presented as a *risāla mukhtaṣara*. At this stage, we do not know nor have we any idea of who might have carried out this eventual abridgment. In addition, the two texts do not present contrasting differences, namely they do not seem to contradict each other.

Yet, the recently discovered Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā and the new edition based on it provide critical passages missing from the most widespread version of the text that further our insights into the meaning of this work and make of it, both in terms of structure and contents, a more coherent construction. For instance, the absence of the promised treatment of the obligations represented by God’s rights (*ḥuqūq allāh*) from the short version of *al-Siyāsa* creates, there, a disruption in the logical thread and content organization of the text that is fortunately filled in by the long version. Similarly, the very concise treatment of the rights of single individuals in the short version produces a thematic imbalance that misled scholars to locate in punishment and jihad the prevailing preoccupations of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* as a whole. When we consider the long version of the text now at our disposal in al-‘Imrān’s edition, things change. Thanks to this version of the text, we acquire a more exhaustive picture of the topics broached by Ibn Taymiyya, and through it we can attempt a deeper understanding of his project.

This paper intended to offer a contribution in this direction by redressing the common view that this famous work of Ibn Taymiyya is basically about jihad, coercion, punishment and the public order. There is more to it. *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* unfolds concisely, yet displaying a very complex and rich texture where a variety of meanings interplay. *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* is not only about jihad. Jihad is of course one major religious duty, but in itself jihad does not occupy an overwhelming position in this specific text. When one compares it with other writings of Ibn Taymiyya on the same topic, written in times of war, the difference

experience in other writings of his. Vasalou, *Ibn Taymiyya’s Ethics*, 72–73. For experience as a source of ethical knowledge, pp. 67–74.

¹⁴² *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 195.

¹⁴³ *Siyāsa*, ed. Ḥarastānī, 197.

in tone, length and even contents, as seen, are undeniable. *Al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* is also not a description of public offices, nor is it focused on the imam, his legitimacy and requisites. This ruler-decentered perspective was perceptively noted long ago by Erwin Rosenthal, then picked up by Sherman Jackson and recently pushed forward by Ovamir Anjum.¹⁴⁴ Finally, *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya fī iṣlāḥ al-rā‘ī wa-l-ra‘iyya* is, also, not about the judicial. I will illustrate this specific point in further research.

On the contrary, I argued that Ibn Taymiyya’s famous treatise is first and foremost about “ethical leadership.” The ethical dimension of *al-Siyāsa shar‘iyya* was recently caught by Abdelsamad Belhaj in a thoughtful reading of the text which is, yet, very much focused on the public order, of which the treatise would be a very harsh critique: “*Siyāsa shar‘iyya* is an ethical criticism of the community and of the state with a strong emphasis on coercive justice.”¹⁴⁵ Or, again in Belhaj’s words, *siyāsa shar‘iyya* is the remedy conceived by Ibn Taymiyya “to a corrupted public order that challenges the legitimacy and the survival of Sharia.”¹⁴⁶ Yet, to fully support this stance, one would have to define what *sharī‘a* was for Ibn Taymiyya. For the time being, it will suffice to observe that in his treatise Ibn Taymiyya does not discuss this word as such, and that he also rarely uses it.

But let us go back to the idea of “ethical leadership.” This idea implies action (ruling and else) beyond personal interests and for the promotion and protection of the common welfare. In turn, this entails a focus on the goals of public authority, not on the institutional forms in which such authority is embedded. Such a focus on means and goals points to a highly utilitarian vision. In operating for the common good, men in authority are not loose. They are restrained by the Qur’ānic obligations to be trustworthy and fair. The big questions then are what the common good consists in and how men in authority know the contents of such common good. The latter is defined first and foremost by *shar‘* (not *sharī‘a*), or the “religious normativity,” which is never explicitly discussed in the treatise. However, at least on the surface, Qur’ān, Prophetic Hadith and the examples set by the Companions and the early generations of Muslims, at times motivated by considerations of hardship and need, mostly provide the ground for good actions. Here and there, occasional commonsensible considerations, or rational arguments, crop up in the text. *Khibra*, and toward the end, experience (*tajriba*) are brought into play as sources of knowledge. The highly synthetic nature of the text and the density that results from it may be deceitful (I suspect) and hide other epistemological resources used by Ibn Taymiyya, but never fully discussed or acknowledged.

The Qur’ān instructs rulers to give back trusts to their owners (Q. 4:58). This scriptural injunction forms the normative ground for the proper management of public wealth required from rulers and their agents. Hence, *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* is also very much concerned with the materiality and sustainability of people’s lives. For some reason, this material aspect of the story has not attracted the attention it deserves, with the notable exception of Baber Johansen.¹⁴⁷ A decent material life is the necessary companion to a most upright spiritual life (*ṣalāḥ al-dīn wa-l-dunyā* is an expression that occurs dozens of times) and assuring a decent material life is one of the rulers’ duties. In order for this to happen, not only will the public order have to be protected and to this end an effective punitive scheme activated, but also, public resources will have to be spent for the common utility and fairly distributed. This is a crucial point and one that is addressed to the community as a whole. Although rulers bear more responsibility, every member of the community is to be involved

¹⁴⁴ Rosenthal, *Political Thought*, 52. Jackson, *Islamic Law*, xxii. Anjum, *Politics Law*, in particular 27 and 249–252.

¹⁴⁵ Belhaj in *Law and order*, 420–421 (the quotation is from p. 420). Belhaj used only the edition of Muḥammad al-‘Imrān and does not seem to be aware of the existence of different versions of the text.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Johansen, *A Perfect Law*, 278–279.

in a constant activity of a balanced give-and-take with a view to the collective welfare. This gaze to the “flock” and not only to its “shepherd”—both parts are addressed in the title of the book—is remarkable and fully emerges in the very last section of the treatise which is dedicated to people’s duties and rights.

Individuals must carry out their duties, but the authorities must operate in order that such duties be effectively performed and people’s claims protected. Perhaps because of their small size, these chapters have been virtually forgotten by all scholars who made an effort to make sense of this text, at least to my knowledge. At this point the new edition by Muḥammad al-‘Imrān—based on Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā—steps into the scene and adds new meanings to it. Here, Ibn Taymiyya tackles economic issues relating to marriage practices which were gaining recognition at the time, and frauds in markets. In this respect, the text shows a very close (and not so surprising) relationship with *al-Hisba*. Of course, Ibn Taymiyya approves none of this. Fraud also involves the fabrication of fake products and, according to Ibn Taymiyya, alchemy plays a major role in counterfeiting. So, here we are, alchemy steps into a portion of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*, so far unnoticed, that is dedicated to correct market practices, suggesting that it must have been quite a popular craft at the time. Apart from this, were not marriage and markets the two social spaces *par excellence* where people met, interacted, negotiated their daily lives, supported themselves and their families? And is it not intriguing that these portions of the text did not survive in the version *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya* which enjoyed a more widespread transmission? Their omission may speak of what was expected from governance literature at the time, although al-Māwardī and more succinctly Ibn Jamā‘a do have sections on *ḥisba*. More positively, their omission speaks of a textual history yet to be discovered concerning the relationship, and partial overlapping, between the *Qā‘ida fī al-ḥisba* and *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*. Certainly, its presence in the long version is an indicator of Ibn Taymiyya’s points of interests. For the common good to be implemented and “ethical leadership” to be practiced, that is for “just *siyāsa*” to take place, the private space of marriage and the public space of markets, each with their own actors, had to abide by certain norms. Concluding, without Sülaymaniyya MS 1553 Shahīd ‘Alī Pāshā and Muḥammad al-‘Imrān’s edition of the text, we would have never gained these insights nor would we have these fascinating new questions in front of us. On the whole, this material opens the door to the study of *al-Siyāsa al-shar‘iyya*’s manuscript transmission and textual history. Such history is in its infancy, pursuing it is urgent.

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